George Greenough was one of the influential group of early nineteenth-century English geologists who rejected both Hutton's and Werner's attempts to propound all-embracing geological theories, and followed a deliberately empirical approach. He travelled through Scotland in 1805, studying geological phenomena in the light of both the Plutonist and the Neptunist theories, and generally concluded that neither was entirely satisfactory as an explanation of the observable facts. He was also the first to suggest that the ‘Parallel Roads’ of Glen Roy (...) were the successive beach-levels of a former lake: this theory was later attacked by Darwin but ultimately vindicated by Agassiz's glacial theory. The more important geological passages from Greenough's MS. journal of the tour are reproduced and discussed in this paper. They illustrate some of the scientific problems that were involved in accepting either Hutton's or Werner's theory entire. (shrink)

In this lucid, concise, internal analysis of the preface and introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit an attempt is made to provide an immanent interpretation of these important essays. After briefly sketching the derivation of the idea of a history of consciousness from Schelling and Fichte and the central role that Kant’s notion of transcendental apperception plays in Hegel’s phenomenology, Werner Marx places Hegel in the "Logos tradition" and presents detailed accounts of the presentation of phenomenal knowledge, natural consciousness, (...) and the progressive development of the "shapes" of consciousness. It is persuasively argued that the Phenomenology is both a science of experience and a science of spirit because it relates the science of spirit to the experience of consciousness. This relatively brief essay is rich in philosophical detail and is a sympathetic account of Hegel’s project. Of special interest is the illuminating treatment of the role of the phenomenologist in the process of displaying the appearance of truth in a totality of moments or "thought-determinations". While admitting that Hegel presents the process of categorical development in a cryptic manner, Marx clarifies the content of Hegel’s preface and introduction and, at the same time, remains faithful to the complexities of Hegel’s phenomenological method. This essay is an excellent companion piece to Hegel’s original prefatory and introductory statements about the intention, method, structure, and aim of the Phenomenology.—G.J.S. (shrink)

According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism, perceptual experiences can provide non-inferential justification for at least some moral beliefs. Moral epistemology, for the defender of AEI, is less like the epistemology of math and more like the epistemology of tables and chairs. One serious threat to AEI comes from the phenomenon of cognitive penetration. The worry is that even if evaluative properties could figure in the contents of experience, they would only be able to do so if prior cognitive states influence (...) perceptual experience. Such influences would undermine the non-inferential, foundationalist credentials of AEI. In this paper, I defend AEI against this objection. Rather than deny that cognitive penetration exists, I argue that some types of cognitive penetrability are actually compatible with AEI's foundationalist structure. This involves teasing apart the question of whether some particular perceptual process has justification-conferring features from the question of how it came to have those features in the first place. Once this distinction is made, it becomes clear that some kinds of cognitive penetration are compatible with the non-inferential status of moral perceptual experiences as the proponent of AEI claims. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a _contrast argument_, a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals to establish a phenomenal contrast between EEDI s and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming (...) non-skeptical moral realism, is that _badness_ is represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in the EEDI ’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast. (shrink)

Non-naturalism is the view that normative properties are response-independent, irreducible to natural properties, and causally inefficacious. An underexplored question for non-naturalism concerns the metasemantics of normative terms. Ideally, the non-naturalist could remain ecumenical, but it appears they cannot. Call this challenge the metasemantic challenge. This chapter suggests that non-naturalists endorse an epistemic account of reference determination of the sort recently defended by Imogen Dickie, with some modifications. An important implication of this account is that, if correct, a fully fleshed out (...) moral epistemology will simultaneously rebut metasemantic objections to non-naturalism. Thus, both the metasemantic and the more widely discussed epistemological challenges in effect amount to one. Before setting out the positive view, the chapter considers why all of the traditional metasemantic theories cause trouble for the non-naturalist. This includes discussions of teleosemantics, conceptual role semantics, as well as Schroeter and Schroeter’s “connectedness” model. (shrink)

Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting this challenge begins by pointing out that we are semantically or conceptually competent in our use of the normative terms, and then argues that this competence guarantees the non-accidental truth of some of our first-order normative beliefs. In this paper, I argue against this strategy by illustrating that this (...) competence based strategy undermines the non-naturalist’s ability to capture the robustly normative content of our moral beliefs. (shrink)

According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Property (KP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access involves a detection of the property via a representational vehicle. A Berkeleyan Property (BP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access to the property involves that property as partly constitutive of the (...) experience itself. In this paper, I set aside generalized arguments in favor of one view or another, and instead ask whether proponents of CMP have reasons to understand moral perception as Kantian or Berkeleyan. I explore three possible explanatory differences—(a) explaining the intrinsic motivating force of moral perceptions, (b) providing a metasemantics for moral properties, and (c) providing an epistemology of the normative authority of moral properties. (shrink)

Left and right libertarians alike are attracted to the thesis of self-ownership because, as Eric Mack says, they ‘believe that it best captures our common perception of the moral inviolability of persons’. Further, most libertarians, left and right, accept that some version of the Lockean Proviso restricts agents’ ability to acquire worldly resources. The inviolability of SO purports to make libertarianism more appealing than its egalitarian counterparts, since traditional egalitarian theories cannot straightforwardly explain why, e.g. forced organ donation and forced (...) labor are serious wrongs even when they generate more equitable outcomes or benefit the greater good. I argue that, when SO is coupled with LP, this appeal is unfounded. SO, as usually construed, allows for the possibility of justified incursions of non-culpable agents up to and including forced organ donation. I conclude by considering a few possible responses on behalf of the libertarian, assessing each one’s plausibility. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling, one of the essential thinkers in the development of German Idealism, formed his own thought not only in a critical dialogue with Kant's and Fichte's transcendentalism and Hegel's earlier conception of thinking, but also in an intensive discussion with Plato and Aristotle. Over and above that, Neoplatonism - especially Plotinus, Proclus and the Christian Dionysius the Areopagite - played a decisive role in Schelling's reception and transformation of ancient philosophy.Selecting the manifold aspects which could be reflected on in (...) this field, I want to make plausible as a transcendental analogy to Plotinus' concept of self-knowledge Schelling's requirement for a raising-up and transformation of the finite 'I' into the form of the Absolute, whose central features converge with the goal of the Plotinian self - transformation of thought into a timeless self-thinking and its ground.A main part of this paper discusses Schelling's and Plotinus' concept of nature as a dynamic process constituted by an immanent 'creating theoria'. Furthermore we find in Schelling's theory of the Absolute as the 'utterly One' a union of Plotinus' notion of a pure One beyond Being with that of the reflexive self-presence of nous, so that this Absolute can be understood as an All-Unity which grounds and embraces all actuality - because it is in itself the most unifying self-affirmation or self-mediation. What follows is a reflection on the anagogical function of art, especially from the viewpoint of Plotinus' non-Platonic rehabilitation of art as an imitation of nature. The last perspectives focus on Schelling's concept of matter and emanation - as different from and at the same time coherent with that of Plotinus - and on Schelling's theory of an absolute self - willing will in connection with Plotinus' Enneads VI.8, 'On free will and the will of the One' as a causa sui. (shrink)

Le philosophe russe Nicolai Vasiliev est connu en tant que précurseur des logiques essentiellement non-classiques, c'est-à-dire de logiques qui diffèrent de la logique classique par l'abandon de principes qui sont corrects en logique classique. La gamme de telles logiques couvre la logique intuitionniste, la logique plurivalente, la logique paraconsistante et les logiques de la pertinence. Dans la première partie de ce texte, j'analyse brièvement les vues de Vasiliev, à savoir sa « logique imaginaire », qu'il présente comme une nouvelle logique (...) non-aristotélicienne. Dans les sections suivantes je discute l'impact des approches de Vasiliev sur la logique du consentement. Ici, les idées essentiellement non-classiques de Vasiliev seront reliées à des logiques non- essentiellement non-classiques, qui ne constituent pas une révision de la logique classique, mais étendent sa puissance expressive. (shrink)

Die Kontroversen um Imre Lakatos' "Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme" haben zu der Frage geführt, ob auf Basis der von Lakatos entwickelten Standards für die Bewertung von konkurrierenden Theorien und Forschungsprogrammen auch heuristische Empfehlungen begründet werden können, die die von Wissenschaftlern auszuführenden Handlungen im Interesse der Maximierung von Erkenntnisfortschritt normieren. Eine solche Frage steht im Zusammenhang mit einem zentralen Anliegen der Popperschen Wissenschaftstheorie: "Wir wollen die Regeln, oder, wenn man will, die Normen aufstellen, nach denen sich der Forscher richtet, wenn er Wissenschaft (...) treibt, wie wir es uns denken". Ob die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme, die Lakatos als Weiterentwicklung des kritisch-rationalistischen Falsifikationismus verstanden wissen will, diesen Ansprüchen genügt, wurde zuerst von Paul K. Feyerabend und Thomas S. Kuhn bezweifelt. Im folgenden werden zunächst deren Kritiken, die Antworten von Lakatos sowie Analysen von J. J. C. Smart, Wolfgang Stegmüller und Philip Quinn diskutiert. Anschließend wird ein neuer Versuch Alan Musgraves kritisch überprüft, unter Rückgriff auf die Bewertungskriterien der Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme heuristische Empfehlungen zu begründen. (shrink)

For years now the “Tübingen School”, represented above all by Konrad Gaiser and Hans Krämer, has had an important position, philologically and philosophically speaking, in current research on Plato. Its richly documented and constantly sophisticated “New Image of Plato” has resulted in a “para-digm-change” in Plato-interpretation as well as developing many of its aspects. It revises the basic attitude, which can be traced back to Schleiermacher, that Plato’s published dialogues are the one authentic source for any adequate and complete comprehension (...) of Platonic thought. By contrast it is especially Krämer and Gaiser who in numerous publications have energetically—and to great effect—drawn attention to what have since Aristotle come to be known as the “unwritten doctrines” and—taking up and modifying specific intentions of L. Robin, J. Stenzel, P. Wilpert and others—attempted to present them not only as a necessary supplement to the dialogues of Plato but even more as the systematically conceived centre, the “essential” in Platonic thought. This hermeneutical maxim has made it possible to reconstruct the basic features of a principles-theory for Plato which not only constitutes the systematic fundament of the Platonic dialogues but has become decisive for the basic conceptual and ontological structure of Neoplatonism and the philosophical systems which are connected with it materially and historically speaking. This has not meant suppressing the dialogues or demoting them to a “quarry” for the real-authentic: thanks to the principles-theory and the theorems connected with it, much which used to have to appear as a break, as something enigmatic or giving rise to discrepancy or aporia, can now be understood in a more thorough way, a way which is more intense in terms of argumentation and even more complex in terms of substance, without that which Plato considered it impossible to say being laid bare in a dull abstraction. Thomas Alexander Szlezák’s book testifies to the degree to which taking seriously those doctrines of Plato which he himself was very “serious” about can be productive—precisely for a new interpretation of the dialogues themselves. Amidst the virtually endless deluge of publications on Plato, a deluge which continues to swell to worrying proportions because of superfluous repetition, Szlezák’s book stands out very strikingly through the originality of its perspective, through the consistent realization of a basic idea which is highly instructive for the subject-matter at hand and through the thoroughness of its examination of competing and above all of opposing ideas which are—with greater or lesser reason—sceptical as regards the new Plato paradigm. Plato’s criticism—discussed in great detail by Szlezák—of the written communicating of philosophical thought becomes for him the key to the question as to the relationship of the oral pursuit of philosophy and the written presentation of the living dialogue. In accordance with Platonic writing-critique it is very much intrinsic to the philosophical logos that it can defend itself, can help itself, that it is in a position productively to continue the questions which are placed in it and which it is asked and in so doing refer to “timiotera”, to “all that is more valuable”, i.e. more extensively justified; not only must these “timiotera” not be explicitly stated, but they ought consciously to be held back, to be omitted and reserved for conversations with real friends who are capable of understanding a higher problem-level. Books, thus also dialogues published in written form, are not inherently able to do this: they “are constantly saying the same thing” and remind one at times of “the prolonged din of cymbals”. It follows from this that “he who has knowledge”, he who has knowledge of “timiotera” and has a sensible attitude towards them, “Plato” the author of philosophical book-dialogues, quite consciously and consistently omits the “problems which are especially to do with principle”. (shrink)

Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge (...) University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Stecker in Br J Aesthet 51(3):295–308, 2011) The claim is supposed to be supported among others by ‘the argument from action.’ In contrast to genuine emotions, proponents of this argument claim, fictional emotions do not motivate their bearers to act. (cf. Yanal in Paradoxes of emotion and fiction, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1999; Lamarque in Br J Aesthet 21(4):291–304, 1981; Carroll in The philosophy of horror: or, paradoxes of the heart, Routledge, London, 1990; Currie 1990; Walton 1978, 1990; Suits in Pac Philos Q 87(3):369–386, 2006; Friend, in: Kind (ed.) The Routledge handbook of philosophy of imagination, Routledge, New York, 2016) This claim grounds in what may appear to be an obvious fact: that viewers and readers of are not led to act by their fictional emotions. It is certainly true that viewers and readers of fiction do not form intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional entities. In contrast to the proponents of the argument from action, I will argue that the lack of any such intentions can be explained only with reference to intending’s doxastic conditions, conditions that are unsatisfied in the fictional scenario. Decisively, this explanation does not refer to the motivational force of the agent’s emotions; indeed, it doesn’t refer to emotions at all. Thus, the lack of intentions to perform actions directed towards fictional objects provides no support for the claim that fictional emotions are no genuine emotions. (shrink)

Although worship of the relics of the Buddha — and its corollary, st?pa worship — is a widespread feature of Buddhist devotional practice among both lay Buddhists and monks, there is in some quarters a view that, while recommended to lay followers, it is forbidden to monks. This controversy started very early after the Buddha’s parinibb?na and has reverberated throughout the centuries till the present time. Its source is in the Mah?parinibb?na Sutta, and it stems from the ambiguity in the (...) meaning of the compound sar?ra-p?j? in the Buddha’s reply to?nanda’s two questions concerning the actions to be taken after the Master’s death with respect to his body. The resolution of the controversy depends on a correct understanding of the nature of the Buddha’s replies to the two questions. This paper analyses the relevant passages of the sutta and the way they have been translated, correctly or incorrectly, into Western languages and into Chinese, and finally arrives at a solution derived entirely from within the text of the Mah?parinibb?na Sutta itself. (shrink)

Historical Dictionary of Buddhism. Charles S. Prebish. The Scarecrow Press Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1993. xxxv, 387 pp. $42.50. Distributed by Shelwing Ltd, Folkestone, at £42.50; Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi 1995. Rs 300.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Big Women:Mark Adamo's Lysistrata, or the Nude Goddess Between Monteverdi and Musical ComedyRalph HexterWe live in an age when opera companies across America are regularly presenting new operas, and some of them are even making hesitant first steps into repertory status, though it is too soon to tell how long- or short-lived their performance history will be. Opera itself began—Peri's Dafne (1597) is commonly regarded as the starting point—as (...) an attempt to recreate Greek tragedy on the stage, and for at least its first two hundred years, plots drawing on classical material, if not always classical literary texts, were staples. Nineteenth-century opera composers were relatively less inclined to turn to the classics for plots and characters, but the twentieth century witnessed renewed activity in classically based operas, from Strauss' Elektra (1909) and Stravinsky's Oedipus Rex (1927) to Hans Werner Henze's Venus und Adonis (1997) and Randolph Peters' The Golden Ass (1999), to name but a few significant examples. Mark Adamo's Lysistrata, or the Nude Goddess, which premiered in Houston in 2005, is among the first operas in our new century to continue the tradition.Accompanied by a trio of distinguished distaff classicists, I attended the 2006 revival of Lysistrata, or the Nude Goddess at the New York City Opera. Some months later, as word of the outing—any resemblance to this or any other Aristophanic comedy is purely accidental—trickled out, AJP's editor asked me to write this "Brief Mention." The reader will infer, then, that I neither watched nor listened with the idea of writing such a notice. What follows are reflections based partially on recollection of my immediate impressions (especially of the music) but also on subsequent study of the published libretto,1 Adamo's earlier and quite popular Little Women (1998), and stray remarks of the composer in published or online [End Page 119] interviews. In no sense is it a review of the particular April 2nd matinee performance that I saw. Of that let me say that my impression was almost uniformly positive. The principals, who have very demanding parts (and not only vocally), were strong; several were reprising roles they had taken in the Houston world premiere.Adamo states on the title page of the libretto that the opera is "[f]reely adapted from the play by Aristophanes," and this is both true and to the good. Before I turn to the adaptation itself, it might be worth observing that within the reception history of ancient stageworks in opera, the tradition of classical comedies turned into operas is relatively slight. I put it that way because, of course, one might well argue that New Comedy in its Roman form is the ultimate source of all opera buffa. I say nothing new when I place Figaro directly in the line of servi callidi.2Greek Old Comedy (i.e., given the state of preservation, Aristophanes) has only infrequently provided fodder for opera. One of the most interesting cases is Walter Braunfels' setting of Aristophanes Birds—Die Vögel—premiered in 1920. Braunfels (1882–1954) was fired from his teaching post by the Nazis in 1933—he was half Jewish—and his works were banished from the repertory. Die Vögel, his most successful stagework, has been recently revived, and a recording is available in Decca's "Entartete ["degenerate"] Musik" series. One must also recall the famous Frogs performed in the pool of Yale's Payne Whitney Gymnasium in 1941, since, a generation later, in 1975, the piece was revived, provided with music and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim and, like so many other shows, transferred from New Haven (if not the Shubert) to Broadway.3Aristophanes is more at home, I would argue, in American musical comedy than in opera, at least opera as it has come to be received by modern audiences treated almost without exception to post-Gluckian opera, with major houses, until recently, shunning the more interesting hybrids. (Think even of Carmen and how long it took for it to lose the recitatives by Guiraud that replaced the original opéra comique spoken dialogue.) To modern spectators or readers, Aristophanes, with... (shrink)

Kockelmans’ book is an anthology of readings which he has collected together and in most cases translated. Eight of the eleven selections have already been published—although not all have appeared in English. Part I contains two essays with no evident connection—one by Kockelmans and a 1961 article from a Dutch periodical by Jan Aler on the view of language in Being and Time. Part II is the heart of the book and contains the translated texts of the six lectures given (...) at the Colloquium at Penn State in 1969 on "Heidegger’s Conception of Language," of which Kockelmans was the director. It also includes the panel discussion among the participants: Walter Biemel, Otto Poeggeler, Henri Birault, Heinrich Ott, Werner Marx and Kockelmans. These papers are extremely high level Heideggerian scholarship and very penetrating studies. They will repay careful study. Part III contains papers of a linguistic nature by Johannes Lohmann and Erasmus Schoefer. The essay by Schoefer is interesting; it is excerpted from his valuable book Die Sprache Heideggers which studies Heidegger’s own use of the German language. This is a worthwhile collection of studies which is enhanced by a bibliography and index.—J. D. C. (shrink)

MODERN ARISTOTELIAN SCHOLARSHIP is heavily indebted to the German scholars of the nineteenth century who produced the Berlin Academy editions of Aristotle's corpus and of his Greek commentators. The foundations for this massive project were laid around the middle of the century by people like Schwegler, who edited and commented on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Yet, while acknowledging our debt to such exemplary scholarship, I want to cast doubt on one of his proposed emendations to Metaphysics 6.1, which influenced later editors like (...) W. D. Ross and Werner Jaeger. (shrink)

The search for an ethics rooted in human experience is the crux of this deeply compassionate work, here translated from the 1983 German edition. Distinguished philosopher Werner Marx provides a close reading, critique, and _Weiterdenken_, or "further thinking," of Martin Heidegger's later work on death, language, and poetry, which has often been dismissed as both obscure and obscurantist. In it Marx seeks, and perhaps finds, both a measure for distinguishing between good and evil and a motive for preferring the (...) former. The poet Hölderlin posed the question, "Is there a measure on earth?" His own answer was emphatic, "There is none," for he was convinced that the measure for man was to be found only in the domain of the heavenly beings. Such metaphysical assumptions, as well as the attempt to found ethical conduct in the nature of man as a rational being, have been rejected by many contemporary thinkers, particularly Heidegger. Yet these thinkers have not been able to provide a satisfactory alternative to metaphysical foundations of the standards for responsible human conduct. Marx, therefore, goes beyond Heidegger in demonstrating how several of his most basic notions could be relevant to a secular morality in our age. It is death, Marx claims, that unsettles man and transforms his conduct toward his fellow man. the common experience of mortality nourishes ethical life—and leads to the measures of compassion, love, and recognition of one's fellow human beings. "It is only on the basis of these 'traditional virtues,'" Marx writes, "that we can find a motive for averting the impending dangers which have often enough been described so vividly and convincingly.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 447-451 [Access article in PDF] Elizabeth Baynham. Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. xiv + 237 pp. Cloth, $39.50. This is a well-organized book that is abreast of recent scholarship and contributes to our understanding of Q. Curtius Rufus and his History of Alexander as a work of literature. Baynham tells us that (...) her primary objective is an analysis of Curtius' historical methods and arrangements of his material and an evaluation of his chief themes. Her introductory chapter sketches the influence of Curtius' History in the Middle Ages and Renaissance and gives a brief synopsis of scholarship in the field. A chapter entitled "Roman Curtius" attempts to place the author and his work into the broader framework of Roman literature, with a particular focus on his language and themes and the influences that shaped these. A lengthy chapter on sources and historical methods reviews Curtius' place within the tradition of ancient historians of Alexander the Great. The three most original chapters explore the motifs of fortuna and regnum in Curtius' portrait of [End Page 447] Alexander. The book concludes with an appendix surveying the debate over the date of Curtius' History of Alexander. Baynham considers at length the current "consensus" view that the work was written under Claudius but ultimately decides that a date under Vespasian is "most likely." The index, unfortunately, is too brief to be very helpful: following up on Baynham's discussion of the idea of regnum in Curtius, the reader must look up eighteen undifferentiated references to libertas. The absence of an index of passages discussed is a serious omission, which detracts significantly from the book's usefulness.Despite Baynham's assertion of the "apathy" and "hostility" of twentieth-century Curtian study (5), Curtius Rufus (as she points out elsewhere) has not lacked for attention in recent decades. J. E. Atkinson's A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni (Amsterdam 1980, 1994) is supplemented by his survey of scholarship on Curtius (ANRW 2.34.4 [1997]: 3447-83). For those without Latin, there is a Penguin translation by John Yardley. At the other end of the scale, there is Jean Therasse, Quintus Curtius Rufus Index Verborum (1976). Some of this work is admittedly excessive and unproductive. The Loeb edition by J. C. Rolfe (1946), for example, is still available and offers a better translation than Yardley. More significantly, it is not clear how much is gained by lengthy commentaries on passages of Curtius, particularly in the face of A. B. Bosworth's Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (1980, 1995) and P. A. Brunt's Loeb edition of Arrian (1976, 1983), which offers such extensive notes that it might well be called a commentary. Of necessity, historical commentators on Arrian and Curtius traverse much of the same ground. Moreover, all this attention to Curtius as a historian has not--perhaps cannot--reverse the commonsense judgment that Arrian is the better and more reliable source.In a sense, the attention of historians has diminished our understanding of Curtius' History of Alexander. Rather than approaching the work as a whole, they ransack Curtius for isolated statements and anecdotes to bolster their own view of particular incidents in Alexander's career. This is poor methodology and poor history. It would be a signal achievement of Baynham's book if it could direct more attention to Curtius by literary scholars. It is in this area that interesting work on Curtius has been done in the last two decades: for example, Werner Rutz's "Zur Erzahlungskunst des Q. Curtius Rufus," ANRW 32.4 (1986): 2329-57, Francesca Minissale's Curzio Rufo: Un romaziere della storia (1983), and H. Currie's "Quintus Curtius Rufus: The Historian as Novelist?" Groningen Colloquia on the Novel 3 (1990): 63-77.Curtius' History of Alexander is a text that might lend itself well to the approaches of genre study and narrative technique. It is disappointing that Baynham does not do more in this direction... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tacitus and the Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone PatreRichard J. A. TalbertWhen our seminar organizers generously invited me to contribute a paper on a topic of my choice, it was a surprise to learn that no discussion of the relationship between Tacitus and the SCPP had already been proposed. This relationship is, after all, one of the most rewarding aspects stemming from the discovery of the document, though inevitably (...) in the limited space available here it will be feasible to explore only two or three dimensions of it.In my abstract, formulated far in advance, I proposed to discuss:1. The contribution, if any, which the SCPP makes to our understanding of Tacitus’ use of the acta senatus2. The placing of the trial episode in Tacitus’ narrative: in particular, if he has deliberately distorted the chronology of a.d. 20, how is our estimate of him as a historian affected, if at all?3. The ways in which Tacitus’ selection and focus of material compare with the SCPP.By the date the seminar convened, however, it was evident that I had no more than cautionary words to contribute about the acta senatus. We still need to establish their precise format, and the SCPP seems to be no help in this regard. In my book (Talbert 1984) I had argued that Tacitus did make extensive use of the acta, 1 and the discovery of the SCPP certainly has done nothing to alter that conviction. At the same time I grant that, even with the SCPP, we still lack proof of this extensive use. Indeed the sheer celebrity of Piso’s case surely diminishes the likelihood of such proof from the SCPP, because it is clear that for this particular episode there was an exceptional range of sources available. Tacitus makes a point of demonstrating how he exploited the range, seeking out evidence of appearances by Antonia (3.3.3), for example, and citing remarks that he recalled seniores making (3.16.1). I should [End Page 89] hesitate to join Werner Eck and Harriet Flower in stating unequivocally that—to use the latter’s words (1997, 709)—“Tacitus’ main source [for the trial] is the acta senatus.” But equally I could not support a claim that the acta senatus made no contribution to his account, either directly, or through one or more intermediaries.To move on to the character of Tacitus’ account and its placing within his narrative of the year 20, it is clear that much can hinge on when during the year the trial is reckoned to have taken place. Frankly, I am no longer convinced either by Eck’s view, or by my own modification of it introduced at the Capri meeting in 1994 and kindly noted by him in the definitive first edition. 2In brief, Eck dates the trial by taking the day that the SCPP was passed (10 December), and then immediately working back according to the intervals cited by Tacitus (3.13.1). At the outset two days were assigned to the prosecution of Piso, and then—after a six-day interval—his defense was to have three (this is the standard ratio of time for each side). In the event, it was after the first or second day of those three that Piso committed suicide. Thereafter, in Eck’s view, the trial was continued and concluded with a minimum of delay, although the only further indication of time offered by Tacitus (3.17.3) is that Plancina’s case took up two days. On this reckoning Eck can fairly maintain that the trial proceedings began somewhere between 28 and 30 November, and concluded with the SCPP on 10 December.At the Capri meeting I cautiously raised various concerns with this timetable. 3 For present purposes only the main one matters, namely that an extraordinary amount of pleading, testifying, proposing, and drafting will have to have been concentrated within an uncomfortably tight time frame. Consequently, I argued for pushing the start of the proceedings farther back into November by some days to permit a less hectic pace.Eck was evidently not persuaded, and perhaps this is of little consequence because clearly... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Report on the Ninth European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies Conference:"Hope: A Form of Delusion? Buddhist and Christian Perspectives"Elizabeth J. Harris, President of the NetworkCan we hope in a world that is shot through with suffering? Should hope be shunned as a form of attachment? Should we affirm our hope or let go of it? And, if we embrace hope, what should we hope for and what can inspire us? (...) Between sixty and seventy people, from sixteen countries, came together to address questions such as these at the ninth conference of the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies, held in glorious weather at Liverpool Hope University in England, between 30 June and 4 July 2011.At the heart of the conference were ten keynote presentations on five crucial aspects of the theme of hope: "Hope and the Critique of Hope," "Hope in Pastoral Situations," "Embodiments of Hope," "Hope in Situations of Hopelessness: Engaged Buddhism and Liberation Theology," and "Eschatologies of Hope." Dr. Sybille Fritsch-Oppermann (Church of Southern Hesse) gave the introductory lecture, which suggested that hope can be seen both as a utopian ideal within and beyond living religions, and a working hypothesis, through which humans can strive toward truth and transcendence.Each theme was addressed from a Buddhist and a Christian perspective, followed by a plenary to enable dialogue between the speakers, and between speakers and participants. Addressing the first theme, "Hope and the Critique of Hope," from a Buddhist perspective, Richard Gombrich (Balliol College, Oxford) robustly argued that hope was not a category relevant to Theravada Buddhism, distinguishing between hope and confidence, and hope and expectation. Werner Jeanrond (Glasgow University), taking the Christian perspective, suggested that a critical theology of hope—an inter-hope dialogue—is necessary, within a critique of other key concepts such as salvation, faith, and love. [End Page 135]Within the session titled "Hope in Pastoral Situations," Dr. Hiroshi Munehiro Niwano (Rissho Kosei-kai, Japan) focused on Rissho Kosei-kai's pastoral work, most movingly its response to the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Notto Thelle (Oslo University), speaking from a Christian viewpoint, sensitively explored pastoral situations caused by life experiences that seem to question and make a mockery of hope, drawing on decades of Buddhist-Christian encounter. Peggy Morgan (Mansfield College, Oxford), addressing the third theme, "Embodiments of Hope," concretized her brief by focusing on a contemporary embodiment of hope capable of emboldening Christians: Rosemary Radford Ruether and her listening dialogue with Buddhism. Mitsuya Dake (Ryukoku University, Japan), on the other hand, chose Amida Buddha as his empowering embodiment of the wisdom, compassion, and non-dualism that lies at the heart of Buddhism, focusing on Shinran's understanding.The theme "Hope in Situations of Hopelessness" was opened to the public in an evening session. Sallie King (James Madison University, USA), using examples such as the Sarvodaya Movement in Sri Lanka and the Dalai Lama's peace work, argued that Buddhism is "loaded" with hope, from an Engaged Buddhist perspective. Buddhist hope, at one level, is an amalgam of acceptance, lawful change, and effort. At another level, it is the conviction that everyone has the potential to change and that truth has power. Sathianathan Clarke (Wesley Theological College, Washington, D.C.) movingly examined Dalit liberation theology, suggesting that hope within this context could be seen as a proxy topos that extends faith into life, an alter-wisdom where love can enrich life, and an energy, a verb, leading to transformative action.Addressing the last theme, "Eschatologies of Hope," Anthony Kelly (Australian Catholic University) recognized a contemporary crisis of hope and, distinguishing between hope as an emotion and hope as a virtue, explored a paradox: that Christian hope is rooted in the resurrection of the crucified Jesus but that this event is described in a varied rhetoric of negations. Justin Ritzinger (Oberlin College, USA), noting that endings are hard to find in Buddhist literature, examined the coming of Maitreya, the future Buddha, as a possible candidate for a Buddhist eschaton. He concluded that the similarities to Christian eschatology are superficial, with the exception of a contemporary reinvention of the Maitreyan tradition in China.In addition to invited keynote speakers, a... (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 5, May 2019, Page 66-68.